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Public Ownership, Firm Governance,
and Litigation Risk
Eric L. Talleyt
Many going-private transactions are motivated-at least ostensibly-by the desire
to escape the burdens and costs of public ownership. Although these burdens have many
purported manifestations, one commonly cited is the risk of litigation, which may be borne
both directly by the firm and/or its fiduciaries or reflected in director and officer
insurance premia funded at company expense. An important issue for the "litigation risk"
justification of privatization is whether alternative (and less expensive) steps falling short
of going private-such as governance reforms-may augur sufficiently against litigation
exposure. In this Article, I consider whether, controlling for other variables related to firm-
specific attributes, various measurable attributes of governance help to predict subsequent
litigation exposure. Although there are some governance features (such as multiple
board service, the presence of a staggered/classified board, institutional investing, and the
proactive adoption of a governance policy) that predict subsequent liability exposure,
most governance indicia appear to be of negligible predictive value, both statistically and
economically. In light of these findings, this Article discusses implications for both the
private-equity market and for corporate/securities law more generally.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to its quasi-hibernation in late 2007, the private-equity (PE)
market rose to historically unprecedented levels. From 2002 through the
third quarter of 2007, the total annual number of PE deals nearly
doubled, and the associated annual dollar value of PE deals approx-
imately quadrupled.' Many privatizations -particularly during and after
the promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 (SOX) and its
regulatory progeny-were concentrated among micro-cap and small-
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cap issuers, an observation that has now been documented numerous
times elsewhere.
The going-private wave of the last half-decade undoubtedly had
many causal drivers (not the least of which was relatively cheap access
to debt available during the period). According to many commentators,
researchers, and the privatizing companies themselves, however, the pri-
vate-equity wave of the last half-decade was at least partially inspired
by an organizational desire to escape the (espoused) burdens of public
ownership, including litigation risk.' While difficult to test directly, this
claim is at least a plausible one. Indeed, SOX (and its regulatory progeny)
substantially enhanced the power of both government and self-regulating
organizations (SROs) to commence enforcement actions against public
issuers and their fiduciaries.5 Moreover, the post-SOX regulatory land-
scape also gave private plaintiffs greater leverage in bringing suit against
public companies. To be sure, most of the provisions of SOX specifically
disclaim the creation of a private right of action, but at the same time
the legislation included key features that almost certainly enhanced the
attractiveness of securities litigation. Most directly, it increased (pros-
pectively) the limitations period for filing a securities fraud action (both
from occurrence and discovery),' thereby enhancing the value of the real
option for shareholders to seek redress of their complaints through litiga-
tion. Somewhat less directly, SOX liberalized the utilization of "fair-fund"
escrows in which to park moneys collected by the SEC from statutory
3 See, for example, Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric Talley, Going-private Deci-
sions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-country Analysis, 25 J L, Econ, & Org *3 (forth-
coming 2009), online at http'//ssm.com/abstract=901769 (visited Jan 11, 2009); Robert R Bartlett III,
Going Private but Staying Public: Reexaming the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-private
Decisions, 76 U Chi L Rev 7,33-38 (2009) (examining data on companies' going-private decisions and
concluding that only small-cap and medium-cap companies have done so to avoid SOX requirements).
4 See, for example, Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric L. Talley, Sarbanes-Oxley's
Effect on Small Firms: What Is the Evidence?, in Susan M. Gates and Kristin J. Leuschner, eds, In the
Name of Entrepreneurship? The Logic and Effects of Special Regulatory Treatment for Small Busi-
ness 143, 165 table 5.3 (RAND 2007), online at httpJ/www.rand.org/pubs/monographst2007/RAND_
MG663.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (offering a concise summary of the literature on the effects of
SOX on small firms and large firms); Maurice R. Greenberg, Regulation, Yes; Strangulation, No,
Wall St J A10 (Aug 21,2006) (highlighting the negative reaction to SOX compliance among public
corporation executives); Alan Murray, For Sarbanes-Oxley Bashers; Some Perspective, Wall St J A2
(Nov 16, 2005) (acknowledging the costs of SOX for smaller firms and the complaints from busi-
nesses of all sizes, but questioning whether the costs of regulation can really explain larger firms
going private).
5 See Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley, Sarbanes-Oxley's Effects on Small Firms at 145-50
(cited in note 4).
6 See Robert Serio and Matthew Kahn, Private Rights of Action and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 38 Sec Reg & L Rep 668,669-71 (Apr 2006) (highlighting possible implied causes of action
arising out of SOX).
7 See 28 USC § 1658.
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fines and disgorgements, holding them for claims by private plaintiffs!
Moreover, the Act set into motion (either directly or through SRO list-
ing requirements) affirmative disclosure requirements on management
or the company,0 which themselves can constitute (in some people's
eyes) the elements of a securities fraud action by prospective plaintiffs.
At the same time, much of the aspirational thrust of SOX was to
make public corporations better governed" -a move that should (or at
least plausibly could) reduce agency costs between managers and inves-
tors. If the Act was successful in accomplishing this goal, then its success
might plausibly be reflected through issuers' susceptibility to investor
litigation. In short, greater concentration on "good governance" by com-
panies could result in less litigation, and the relative benefit of going pri-
vate would decline accordingly. Viewed in this light, the litigation-risk
justifications of going private would be a substantially less plausible
explanation of the PE trend, and other (possibly less heroic) motiva-
tions may have been at its core.
This Article considers the empirical relationship between corpo-
rate governance and litigation risk. Using a broad panel dataset of pub-
lic companies from 2001 to 2006, 1 explore the questions about whether
and how-controlling for a number of firm-specific and market va-
riables-a firm's structural governance choices predict its later suscep-
tibility to securities class action litigation.
Although the predictive effects of governance on the incidence of
litigation and exposure risk are important for a number of reasons, as
noted above, they may be particularly informative in understanding and
evaluating the private-equity trend that has-until recently-flourished
in the post-SOX environment. Legal-exposure risks are borne by a
8 See SOX § 308, 116 Stat at 784-85, codified at 15 USC § 7246.
9 See, for example, SOX § 302(a), 116 Stat at 777, codified at 15 USC § 7241(a) ("The
[SEC] shall, by rule, require ... that the principal executive officer ... and the principal financial
officer ... certify [ ] each annual or quarterly report."); SOX § 404(a), 116 Stat at 789, codified at
15 USC § 7262(a) (requiring each annual report to contain an internal control report, which
states an internal control structure for financial reporting and contains an assessment of the
effectiveness of that control structure).
10 See, for example, NYSE, Listed Company Manual §§ 201-04, online at http://www.nyse.com/
lcm/lamnsection.html (visited Jan 11, 2009) (requiring NYSE-listed companies to disclose, among other
things, material news developments, annual financial statements, and interim earnings reports).
11 See, for example, John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
21 J Econ Perspectives 91, 92 (Winter 2007) (noting the "variety of long-term benefits" promised
by SOX, including the fact that "[i]nvestors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft,
and benefit from more reliable financial reporting, greater transparency, and accountability");
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoriq Light Reform (and It Just
Might Work), 35 Conn L Rev 915, 955-56 (2003) (alluding, somewhat skeptically, to the require-
ment that the CEO and CFO design internal controls, and then certify their integrity, as an ex-
ample of a provision that lawmakers hoped would inspire better corporate governance by taking
the defense of ignorance off the table).
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combination of current and prospective fiduciaries of the issuers (who
may demand more compensation in exchange for the added risk), and
the issuers themselves (who also face liability exposure and in any event
generally pay director and officer (D&O) insurance premiums asso-
ciated with litigation risk). Anecdotally, it is notable that during the last
few years numerous D&O insurers have begun to "grade" issuers' go-
vernance based on perceived litigation risk, and in addition numerous
private vendors have moved into the market of predicting such litiga-
tion susceptibility." Moreover, beyond the availability of low-cost debt
capital, many ascribe the private-equity wave of the last seven years to a
combination of (1) a desire to remove the regulatory and litigious over-
hang that drags down returns of public companies; and (2) a desire to
put a public issuer in a type of "quarantine" away from the oversight of
corporate law, activist shareholders, and securities regulation/litigation,
where the public focus on "good governance" may run wide of the mark
of what is appropriate for that firm.'3 To the extent that the various go-
vernance reforms implemented under SOX were efficacious in reducing
agency costs and fraud (and associated litigation), then the above two
arguments would not be very convincing. On the other hand, if the go-
vernance reforms championed in the post-SOX environment did not
have much of an effect in reducing litigation costs associated with secur-
ities litigation, then it would lend some support to these possible de-
fenses of the going private.
My empirical findings, while qualitatively mixed, appear to be more
consistent with the latter argument above. That is, the predictive rela-
tionship I am able to uncover between governance choices and prospec-
tive litigation risk is relatively (and in some ways surprisingly) modest.
While there are particular governance features (for example, multiple
board service, the proactive adoption of a corporate governance poli-
cy, and to some extent the existence of a classified/staggered board) that
bear relatively strongly and robustly on prospective litigation risks, most
factors-and indeed most of those promulgated by SOX that the data
studied here can measure -appear to have little predictive effect on the
incidence of litigation and a firm's exposure once sued.
It is important to note from the outset that this Article does not at-
tempt to analyze executive compensation either as a component of go-
12 See, for example, The Corporate Library, Securities Litigation Risk Analyst, online at http://
www.thecorporatelibrary.com/info.php?id=49 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (advertising software that pre-
dicts the likelihood of a securities class action against a company using factors like the company's
"governance risk").
13 Consider Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study,
14 J Applied Fin 36,37 (Spring/Summer 2004) (reporting that firms that had recently gone private
most often cited as their primary reason the cost of being public, in both dollars and time).
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vernance structure or as a predictor of litigation risk. This omission is
deliberate and has multiple justifications. Primarily, the relationship be-
tween compensation and litigation risk is already one that has been ex-
plored extensively in the literature. Previous research has found that the
structure of an executive's compensation package (and in particular, the
fraction of one's compensation that comes through incentive payments,
bonuses, and/or stock and options compensation) is relatively predictive
of later accounting restatements, SEC investigations, and private securi-
ties litigation." A contemporaneous paper to this one considers whether
a company's voluntary disclosure of a Rule 10b5-1 compensation plan is
a marker of litigation risk." There the authors find, somewhat surprising-
ly, and using controls similar to those used here, that disclosure of a
1610b5-1 plan is strongly associated with future litigation risk. Moreover,
the exclusion of compensation from my analysis has some rationale in
the data. It turns out that most of the available data on executive com-
pensation comes from Compustat's ExecuComp Database, which focuses
solely on relatively large issuers in the S&P 1500. Given that many sued
firms come from a much smaller capitalization stratum -and it is these
firms that appear to have been the most likely to utilize going-private
strategies -using compensation data (even as a control) would tend to
eliminate from view the set of firms that are among the most interesting
for this study. Finally, including executive compensation as a "right-hand
side" variable can create problems from an econometric perspective,
since compensation and litigation susceptibility are endogenously part of
an overall system. Thus, if one were to include executive compensation as
14 See, for example, Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr, and Yisong S. Tian, Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter *5 (European Finance Associa-
tion 2006 Zurich Meetings, Feb 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960 (visited Jan 11,
2009); Eric L. Talley and Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and
Securities Litigation *4 (University of Southern California Law School Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper No 04-7, May 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=536963 (visited Jan 11, 2009)
("[W]e estimate that each 1% increase in the fraction of a CEO's contract devoted to medium- to
long-term incentives (rather than short-term compensation) predicts a 0.3% increase in expected
litigation and a $3.4 million dollar increase in expected settlement costs."); Bin Ke, Do Equity-based
Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earnings Increases?
*2 (14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting, Feb 2004), online at http://
ssm.com/abstract=446540 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (concluding that executives with high equity-based
compensation are more likely to manage earnings reports to ensure there is a string of consecu-
tive earnings increases for their own personal gain).
15 See M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Karl A. Muller, Scienter Disclosure
(University of Chicago Law School Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 411, July 2008),
online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1137928 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
16 Id at *2-3 (finding that insiders may voluntarily disclose information prior to strategic
trades in order to mitigate future litigation risks).
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a control variable, one would need to have a good set of instruments for
compensation structure, independent from governance and litigation."
This Article is in many ways related (and in some way a product of)
the growing body of finance scholarship in empirical corporate gover-
nance. Among finance scholars, the practical importance of governance
considerations became most salient with the seminal paper by Paul
Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (GIM) published in 2003 (but
circulated at least a year before).' There the authors developed a gover-
nance index consisting of the sum of twenty-four distinct indicator va-
riables reflecting structural governance choices,'9 and asked how well the
"democratic" firms fared in terms of shareholder value relative to their
"nondemocratic" counterparts. The results were remarkable: it for exam-
ple, an investor put together a portfolio that went long in the democratic
firms and short in the nondemocratic ones, that investor would have out-
performed a randomly chosen portfolio with identical risk characteristics
by 8.5 percent over the 1990s.2 Moreover, democratic firms were found to
have higher firm value,2' higher profits and stronger sales growth,22 lower
capital expenditures" and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
2
.
There have been a number of refinements of the GIM approach
over the years. Some of them have attempted to isolate the "principal
components" of their index;n others have attempted to assign weights to
17 See Joshua D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger, Instrumental Variables and the Search for
Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, 15 J Econ Perspectives 69,69-70
(Autumn 2001). For similar reasons I have also deliberately excluded the incidence of earnings
restatements and of federal civil/criminal litigation as a predictor of subsequent litigation. To be
sure, both controls are highly predictive of later or contemporaneous shareholder suits, but they
too are likely to be plagued by endogeneity problems and could therefore bias the estimates of
the governance variable coefficients.
18 Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,
118 Q J Econ 107 (2003).
19 See id at 114-19 (explaining the statistical methodology behind the construction of their
dataset). See also id at 112 table 1 (listing the governance variables used in the study); id at 145-50
(providing detailed information on each of the variables). For example, if a company maintained a
poison pill, that factor would count as a point in the GIM index and would be added to other points
that the company might have accrued in other measures (such as blank-check preferred stock,
golden parachutes, and so forth). Id at 115 ("Thus the Governance Index [ ] is just the sum of one
point for the existence (or absence) of each provision."). High scorers were deemed to be "non-
democratic," giving little power to shareholders, and vice versa for low scorers. Id at 116 (group-
ing firms with a GIM index greater than or equal to fourteen in the "Dictatorship Portfolio" and
firms with a GIM index less than or equal to five in the "Democracy Portfolio").
20 Id at 144.
21 Id at 128.
22 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 118 Q J Econ at 129 (cited in note 18).
23 Id at 133-34.
24 Id at 134-37 (examining data on corporate acquisitions and finding that nondemocratic
firms have done so at a higher rate potentially to stave off "empire collapse").
25 See, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
Corporate Governance? *1-5 (Harvard Law School Olin Law, Economics & Business Discussion
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the components of the index to improve its predictive power; 2 still oth-
ers have attempted to combine their index with other data to improve
upon it.21 Other ways that governance may matter have been more elu-
sive but are still the topic of significant collective research. For example,
recent research on governance and executive compensation appears to
confirm the argument (albeit weakly) that "well governed" firms also
tend to structure executive compensation in a manner that more closely
ties pay to performance.T
Nevertheless, the enterprise of empirical corporate governance has
not been free from controversy. A recent study, for example, finds that
even though popular corporate governance scores do well in explaining
past performance, they fare much more poorly in predicting future per-
formance or litigation risk.2 It would, of course, seem unlikely on a
priori grounds that such scores should perform well in predicting litiga-
tion risk given that they were not crafted with that in mind; rather, their
strength (or at least purported strength) is in predicting other elements
of shareholder value.T My enterprise in this Article, in contrast, is much
more fundamental-to determine whether the primitive building blocks
of a corporate governance ranking themselves have predictive pow-
er-even if the prevailing indices that aggregate those scores are less
reliable. The fact that even these primitives have a predictive ability that
is at best modest provides yet another insight into why their aggrega-
tion into an off-the-rack governance "score" might similarly fare poorly.
Another important literature that is related to this Article is the
large body of work on the determinants of securities litigation, and in
particular how the relative incidence of frivolous and meritorious suits
Paper No 491, Sept 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (analyzing
a subset of the GIM index consisting of six factors-four that concern shareholder voting power
and two measures taken in preparation to hostile takeovers-and concluding that these six
factors are largely responsible for the relation between performance and corporate governance).
26 See, for example, Robert M. Bowen, Shivaram Rajgopal, and Mohan Venkatachalam,
Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance *20 n 11 (14th Annual Confe-
rence on imancial Economics and Accounting, Jan 2003), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=367940
(visited Jan 11, 2009) (considering several board characteristics and the GIM index as separate
measures of governance).
27 See, for example, Lawrence D. Brown and Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and
Firm Performance *3-4 (Working Paper, Dec 2004), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423
(visited Jan 11, 2009) (considering the GIM in conjunction with proxies for board monitoring,
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, incentive compensation by bonus or stock op-
tions, and auditor expertise).
28 See Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensa-
tion, 58 J Fin 2351, 2352 (2003).
29 See Robert Dairies, Ian Gow, and David Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Com-
mercial Corporate Governance Ratings? *29 (Stanford Law School Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No 360, June 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
30 Significantly, Daines, Gow and Larcker report that most commercial ratings do not
perform well as predictors even of standard shareholder value measures. Id at *21-26.
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has changed over the years.3 Although I have little to say about the is-
sue of whether meritorious lawsuits have increased over the last decade,
my findings may have at least some tangential relevance. Intuitively,
one might conjecture that as the incidence of frivolous litigation de-
creases, the connection between governance and litigation risk should
grow stronger. The moderate to underwhelming results I find here,
then, might also be consistent with a claim that regardless of their tra-
jectory over the last decade, securities class actions remain a relatively
noisy and unpredictable function of governance choices.
One significant caveat that deserves explicit mention before pro-
ceeding concerns the nature of most (if not all) attempts to understand
the empirical relationship between governance and observable outcomes:
it is difficult to overemphasize the caution one should exercise about in-
terpreting the results of the sort of empirical exercise conducted here as
a test of causal theories relating governance and other outcomes. In a
manner similar to (though less extreme than) the executive compensa-
tion discussion above, governance attributes within a firm are frequent-
ly endogenous, making it difficult to find reliable, independent statistical
instruments for predicting those choices. While there are many things
one can try to do to confront this problem (such as lagging the inde-
pendent variables of interest, adding additional controls, and using oth-
er measures), the problem of endogeneity bias is unlikely to crumble
away. This criticism is, of course, true both for those who purport to find a
relationship between governance and a variable of interest and those
who purport to find little or no relationship. Consequently, should there
be refinements that would better address these issues than those uti-
lized here (and there undoubtedly are), then my results must be inter-
preted in light of those possible refinements.
My analysis proceeds as follows. Part I describes the overall ar-
chitecture and structure of the dataset, providing summary statistics of
the variables that are available within it. Part II then presents an anal-
ysis of the incremental effects of numerous governance characteris-
tics - controlling for a number of other market characteristics - on the
prospective incidence of securities class actions. Part III conducts a
31 See generally, for example, Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less after the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 598 (2007) (looking at the impact of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) on meritorious securities litigation
and concluding that although the PSLRA has reduced the incidence of "nuisance suit litigation,"
it has also worked to reduce more meritorious litigation aimed at smaller companies and com-
panies engaged in fraud whose existence is not evinced in pre-filing "hard evidence"); Marilyn E
Johnson, Karen K. Nelson, and A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter? The Impact of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 627 (2007) (looking at the same question
and finding evidence that, post-PSLRA, plaintiffs' attorneys are more precisely targeting firms
likely to have committed fraud).
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similar analysis in predicting the outcomes of litigation for those com-
panies that are sued. Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of my
results more generally and offers some concluding remarks.
I. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The raw data for my empirical enterprise is drawn from three prin-
cipal sources. The first is the Securities Class Action Alert (SCAA),
which has tracked securities litigation since the late 1980s.32 For the pur-
poses of this study, I harvested the SCAA data from January 2001
through March 2006. The dataset identifies sued firms by both name
and eight-digit CUSIP number(s), and it also includes information
about named natural persons, filing dates, class periods, indicator va-
riables for the type of allegations (for example, § 10(b), § 11, generally
acceptable accounting principles (GAAP) violations, and so forth),
the type of plaintiff (institutional or individual), the jurisdiction/court
hearing the case, the case disposition (dropped, dismissed, summary
judgment, final adjudication, or settlement), the ultimate terms of the
settlement/judgment, the attorneys representing the plaintiffs/defendants,
the compensation terms for the attorneys, and textual descriptions of
the precise allegations."
The second principal database is the corporate governance data
tracked by the Corporate Library (CL). Most of this dataset tracks
noncompensation governance metrics of boards-the building blocks
of CL's rankings. Data reflected in the CL dataset include the state/
jurisdiction of incorporation, the issuer's listing exchange, insider and
institutional investor control, the number of annual meetings (both of
outsiders and as a whole), whether the company had adopted a business
ethics and/or governance code in the reporting year, and a significant
amount of information about the demographic characteristics of board
members (age, gender, experience as an executive, and so forth). The
data used for this study covers the 2001 to 2005 reporting years.
Although the SCAA and CL data constitute the core targets of in-
quiry for this Article, I also utilized data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) for purposes of establishing some market
controls' CRSP tracks securities prices, capitalization, volume, returns,
and volatility among publicly traded American firms. Although I am not
32 The SCAA is now published by RiskMetrics Group and is referred to as Securities Class
Action Services. See RiskMetrics Group, http://sca&issproxy.comLogin.php (visited Jan 11, 2009).
33 For a description of the SCAA, see RiskMetrics, Securities Class Action Services 1-2, online
at https://www.riskmetric com/sites/default/files/SCASResearchFiling.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
34 For a description of the CRSP database, see Database Guides, Center for Research in
Security Prices (Chicago Booth School of Business), online at http://www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu/
documentation/ (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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interested in examining how such securities market measures predict
litigation risk, it is relatively well established that such measures can
play a substantial predictive role in securities litigation risk, and I
therefore included key variables as controls. I therefore utilize a num-
ber of CRSP variables to serve as controls for my analysis.
In merging the principal datasets, it was important to remain mind-
ful of the fact that only a small minority (ranging from 2 to 5 percent) of
publicly traded firms are sued in any given year. Thus, one cannot ex-
pect to have a one-to-one match between the governance and litigation
databases. Consequently, the only firm-year observations that were
dropped were those involving firms that appeared in the litigation da-
tabase but for which I was unable to find a match within the CL and
CRSP database. These dropped observations almost certainly bias the
sample in favor of larger issuers that the Corporate Library tends to
track. (As with most ratings and proxy advisory firms, the CL tracks
slightly more than half of all publicly traded firms, skewed toward the
larger capitalization issuers.) The merge was performed according to
the six-digit (historical) CUSIP code of the issuer or-if that was not
available -the issuer's exchange ticker code.
The merged dataset consists of an unbalanced panel spanning the
five-year period of the panel, comprised of 9,455 firm-years and 377
securities class actions. The summary statistics for the merged dataset
are reflected in Tables la-c below. Note that in many cases, the Corpo-
rate Library governance data was missing values for its key variables
for a number of sued firms. Thus, most of the later regressions that fol-
low will utilize only a portion of CL data (around 50 percent of the raw
data, sometimes less). As can be seen from Table la, this creates some
bias in the direction of larger US issuers (for example, 93 percent of the
sample is comprised of US corporations, the mean number of employees
is over 85,000, and fully 39 percent of the firms in the merged dataset
appear in the Russell 1000 index for that year).
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TABLE 1A
SUMMARY STATISTICS- MARKET CONTROL VARIABLES
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Company Age (years) 5370 42.35102 47.38025 0 230
US Corporation (1 if yes) 9455 0.9353781 0.2458705 0 1
Delaware Corporation (1 if yes) 9455 0.5359069 0.4987354 0 1
Employees (Log) 8918 8.487771 1.685237 0 19.25
In Russell 1000 Index 9455 0.3922792 0.4882842 0 1
In S&P Midcap Index 9455 0.2070862 0.4052393 0 1
In S&P Smallcap Index 9455 0.2956108 0.456341 0 1
Mean Monthly Price (Log) 9142 3.126659 0.808775 -2.996 7.201
Mean Monthly Volume (Log) 9159 11.39143 1.594765 3.004 16.828
Mean Gross Abnormal Return (Log) 9121 0.0059051 0.1352223 -1.243 1.355
Mean Return Volatility 9114 0.3816908 0.2580139 0.028 4.067
Table lb reports on the attributes of the 377 firms subject to suit.
Note that the incidence of litigation against the issuers in the dataset is
higher than it is among all publicly traded firms.35 Between 4 and 5 per-
cent of the sample (slightly less for all firm-years) is named in a securi-
ties class action in the reporting years. This is more than twice the size
of the historical litigation incidence rate, a fact that is not surprising
given the larger capitalization of the sample relative to the entire popu-
lation of public companies. The distribution of settlement values re-
ported for the sued firms is right-skewed, with a mean value of $50 mil-
lion, but a median of approximately $10 million and a 75th percentile
of just under $30 million.
35 By most estimates, there are around 12,000 to 15,000 publicly traded companies in the
United States, and historically there have been around 200 to 220 class actions filed per year,
which would yield a prediction of around a 1.3 to 1.8 percent litigation rate. See Walkers Re-
search, online at http://www.walkersresearch.com (visited Jan 11, 2009) (subscription required).
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TABLE 1B
SUMMARY STATISTICS-LITIGATION DATA
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Institutional Lead Plaintiff 377 23.92% 18.20% 0 1
GAAP Violations Alleged 377 32.19% 21.83% 0 1
IPO Violations Alleged 377 3.04% 2.95% 0 1
Related to Restatement 377 18.05% 14.79% 0 1
Section 10b 377 69.59% 21.16% 0 1
Section 11 377 6.96% 6.47% 0 1
Settlement Value ($2005)
(if greater than 0) 134 $51,500,000 $141,000,000 $81,814 $1,130,000,000
Cash Settlement Portion ($2005) 134 $32,800,000 $107,000,000 $0 $1,130,000,000
Dismissed 377 1.66% 12.78% 0 1
Finally, Table 1c reports on twenty governance variables of the
firms included in the database. A few items here warrant particular at-
tention. First, very few firms (just over 5 percent) are controlled either
directly or indirectly by corporate insiders. Institutional investors, on
the other hand, play a large ownership role -collectively owning a ma-
jority stake in approximately 70 percent of the sample. Most institution-
al investor stakes, however, are not coordinated with one another, as
reflected in the appreciably lower rate of dominant shareholder owner-
ship (24 percent). In about one-third of the sample, the CEO was also
the chairperson. The database also includes measures on whether the
issuer maintained a governance policy and/or a business ethics code.
Although both of these became putatively mandatory in SROs' listing
requirements by 2004,6 companies were somewhat slow to adopt them,
and thus my data observes variation on these measures in both the pre-
and post-SOX years.
36 See, for example, NYSE, Listed Company Manual at § 303A.10 (cited in note 10) ("Listed
companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers
and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the code for directors or executive offic-
ers."); id at § 303A.09 (requiring that NYSE-listed companies adopt corporate governance guide-
lines that at a minimum address director qualification standards, director responsibilities, direc-
tor access to management and independent advisors, director compensation, director orientation
and education, management succession, and annual performance reviews of the board).
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TABLE 1C
SUMMARY STATISTICS - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES
Standard
Variable Observations Mean Deviation Min Max
Insiders Control
Institutional Investor Majority
Institutional Investor Ownership Stake
Classified/Staggered Board
Majority Outsider Board
Outside Board Members Meet
Business Ethics Code
Governance Policy
Directors' Base Pay ($000, 2005 dollars)
Outside Board Members (percent)
Other CEO Board Members (percent)
Board Members with > 15 Years
Experience (percent)
Board Members Serving on _ 4 Boards
(percent)
Board Members > 70 Years Old (percent)
Women Board Members (percent)
Dominant Shareholder
Audit Committee Independent
Compensation Committee Independent
Nominating/Governance Committee
Independent
CEO Is Chair
6124
6125
8525
9430
9421
6108
5852
9418
8877
9421
9421
0.0566623
0.7142857
0.6450231
0.5632025
0.9369494
0.8865422
0.9634313
0.3587811
25.23128
67.27375
36.52972
0.2312151
0.4517908
0.2221165
0.4960157
0.2430669
0.3171775
0.1877164
0.4796683
18.67201
18.30169
29.23046
9421 14.63755 17.3344 0 100
9.26789
8.678846
9.409655
0.2416724
0.988111
0.9615194
12.20255
12.25187
9.117241
0.4281339
0.1084011
0.1923774
4029 0.8880616 0.3153298 0
3329 0.3331331 0.4714045 0
One should also note from the three tables above the fact that some
of the governance variables have greater breadth across the dataset
than do others. (For example, the "CEO Is Chair" indicator variable has
significantly more missing data than, say, whether the board is classi-
fied/staggered.) This will cause the effective sample size of the estima-
tions below to vary (depending on data coverage) across different forms
of governance variables.
II. INCREMENTAL GOVERNANCE EFFECTS ON
LITIGATION INCIDENCE
Perhaps the most transparent (and least confusing) way to think
about how governance metrics might predict litigation risk is to study a
number of them sequentially in isolation. I turn to this task below, analyz-
ing the incremental likelihood of securities litigation, controlling for in-
1
1
0.999
1
1
1
1
1
400
100
100
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dustry and capital market effects, and for various measures of gover-
nance performance. In the interests of conserving time and space, I limit
my attention to the governance factors that are of greatest interest.
A. Litigation Exposure: Component-wise Effects
Consider first the likelihood that an issuer is subject to a private
suit as a function of its governance characteristics and a set of market
controls. Specifically, consider the following functional relationship, in
which the dependent variable is the probability that an issuer is subject
to suit:
Pr(Yi, t = 1)= f(a+ /xi, , + pi,,  -,)
In the above expression, the dependent variable y, l is the event
that a class action is filed against the company in the year following the
reporting year; f(.) denotes an increasing function bounded between 0
and 1; a, fi and yare estimated parameters; z,, is a vector of industry and
securities market controls for each issuer i at each reporting year t. In
all the specifications that follow, the controls include logged price, logged
monthly volume, the logged gross abnormal returns, return volatility,
logged number of employees, Delaware incorporation, exchange dum-
mies, industry dummies, capitalization dummies, and foreign issuer sta-
tus; ., is an error term for firm i in year t. Finally, x,, denotes a single go-
vernance characteristic of the issuer, considered sequentially. (In Part lI.B,
I will report on combinations of and interactions between governance
characteristics in fuller specifications.) In all specifications below, I use
a random-effects logit likelihood function (though I obtained similar
results with random- and fixed-effect linear probability estimates).37
Although I will not delve deeply in what follows into the coefficient
estimates of the baseline model - treating them strictly as controls - it is
perhaps worth reporting on the estimates of these control variable coef-
ficients as an initial matter. Table ld presents these results; keep in mind
that the estimation procedure takes advantage of the panel structure of
the data to estimate a random-effects logit specification, in which the
dependent variable is the probability of the filing of a securities class
action within the succeeding reporting year. Because of the presence of
numerous binary variables, the coefficient for each variable in Table ld
(and many of those that follow in this Part) is expressed in terms of an
odds ratio: thus, values falling below one reflect a smaller predicted like-
37 It would, in principle, also be possible to use a conditional logit (fixed-effects) approach
here. However, because there is not a considerable amount of variation among the governance
variables over time, I report on a random-effects estimator throughout.
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lihood of suit (all else equal), and vice versa for reported coefficient val-
ues exceeding unity.38
TABLE 1D
RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT ESTIMATION;
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ISSUER NAMED IN SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION DURING SUCCEEDING REPORTING YEAR
OR P > z 95 Percent Low 95 Percent High
Age of Company 1.001757 0.7350 0.9916097 1.012008
US Corporation 18.64989** 0.0300** 1.326881 262.1324
Delaware Corporation 0.8630468 0.7550 0.342404 2.175354
Employees (Log) 1.020128 0.8810 0.7849975 1.325688
In Russell 1000 9.327671** 0.0000"* 3.407155 25.5361
In S&P Mid Cap 1.922995 0.2140 0.6848797 5.399356
In S&P Small Cap 4.153802** 0.0260** 1.188713 14.51492
Mean Price (Log) 3.481992** 0.0000"* 1.994971 6.077417
Mean Volume (Log) 0.542924** 0.0010** 0.374905 0.7862415
Average Abnormal Return
(Gross; Log) 5.752032* 0.0850* 0.7838325 42.21038
Average Volatility of Return 760.4113** 0.0000"* 116.0337 4983.252
N Observations 1453
N Firms 586
Log Likelihood -655.66954
Wald Chi Squared Statistic
(p-value) 0.0000
Note: All coefficients are reported as order statistics. Baseline market control variables include company age,
jurisdiction, capitalization measures, price, volume, abnormal returns, and volatility. ** (*) figures are statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent (10 percent) level.
As can be seen from the Table, the fit of the baseline model ap-
pears to be strong (X2(11) = 63.57; p = 0.000), suggesting that the con-
trols collectively do a relatively good job of explaining variance in litiga-
tion risk. Moreover, seven of the eleven controls in this baseline model
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and six of them are
significant at the 5 percent level. Note that US corporations are much
more likely than foreign incorporated firms to be sued and that some
measures of capitalization appear to play a significant role, with both
38 There are some "right-hand side" variables that are measured not in binary fashion but
rather in a continuous fashion. In order to remain consistent in how I report later results, I will
report all results in odds ratios. Although this leads to some cumbersome interpretations for nonbi-
nary variable coefficients, it elucidates the lion's share of them.
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large-cap firms and small-cap firms attracting the greatest attention.9
In particular, variables that are related to the likely stakes associated
with a securities settlement (such as price, volume, abnormal returns,
and volatility) have tremendous explanatory value. Consistent with
other studies on securities litigation, the most predictive single element
appears to be the volatility in the return of the issuer's common
stock." In addition, however, the higher the price and volume of the
stock (holding constant the volatility), the greater the likely loss claim,
and thus the more lucrative the case.
With the underlying structural model described above operating
as a baseline, Table 2a now proceeds to consider the added predictive
effect of governance variables. Each line from the Table reports on the
marginal coefficient estimates of the above specification with the hig-
hlighted governance attribute added as the x,,, variable. (That is, each
row from the Table represents a coefficient estimate from a different
regression.) As with the baseline estimation above, the coefficient for
each variable is reported as an odds ratio, so as to facilitate the interpre-
tation of the coefficient for dummy variables.
Before discussing the factors in the Table that are significant, it is
perhaps worth noting just how many of them are not. Specifically, there
does not appear to be much predictive power to any of the factors
relating to corporate control by insiders, classified/staggered boards,
outside majorities on either the board itself or on significant commit-
tees (audit, compensation, or nominating/governance), and the shared
role of CEO and chairperson;' in many respects, both the reforms im-
plemented by SOX and the recent publicity around shareholder rights
have concentrated on addressing and altering each of these perceived
39 The omitted category in the capitalization rankings contains firms that appear neither in
the Russell 1000 nor the S&P small- and medium-cap indices. Because this omitted category
constitutes a mixture of middling to small-cap firms that are not in an index, the mid-cap order
statistic coefficients have an interpretation that is more challenging. Alternatively controlling for
(logged) capitalization does not significantly improve the predictiveness of the baseline model
beyond these indicator measures of capitalization.
40 Throughout the analysis, I measure volatility in any year as the standard deviation of the
logged monthly gross returns during the year. This is consistent with standard asset-pricing ap-
proaches in option-pricing theory. See Mark Grinblatt and Sheridan Titman, Financial Markets
and Corporate Strategy 280-83 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed 2002). Although there is nothing sacrosanct
about using stock volatility (for example, public debt holders, preferred shareholders, and even
option holders can also be securities fraud plaintiffs), this measure is directly tied to derivatives
prices, and the presence of common shareholders in such suits is nearly ubiquitous.
41 One word of caution: for the "CEO Is Chairman" regression, the CL data is more li-
mited, and I was forced to drop some of the capitalization variables from the baseline regression.
However, even if one drops all control variables, the "CEO Is Chairman" factor never appears to
play any appreciable predictive role.
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"problems."2 It may well be that they are problems, but the data do
not appear to suggest that shareholders were reacting to these prob-
lems by ratcheting up their own securities litigation efforts. Adding to
the intrigue is the effect of a large sample size: in large datasets, statis-
tical significance is not terribly hard to come by in its own right.
Moreover, the approach used here-adding in each governance varia-
ble individually in sequence rather than including them all simulta-
neously-is even more likely to render results that are statistically
significant. The fact, therefore, that only seven of the twenty gover-
nance variables explored yield statistically significant predictions of
litigation exposure is telling- not definitive, of course, but telling.
42 See, for example, Gretchen Morgenson, Soviet-style Proxies Made in the USA., NY
Times Cl (June 25,2006).
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TABLE 2A
RANDOM-EFFECTS LOGIT ESTIMATION;
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ISSUER NAMED IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION DURING SUCCEEDING REPORTING YEAR
Governance Variable OR p-value N LogLik
Insiders Control 1.756922 0.429 1421 -640.63
Institutional Majority 0.9689254 0.944 1422 -641.17
Institutional Percentage 0.03761** 0.002** 1367 -620.97
Classified/Staggered Board 1.832805 0.237 1452 -654.77
Outside Majority Board 0.8567479 0.902 1452 -655.01
Outside Board Meetings 0.7128763 0.470 1420 -638.70
Business Ethics Code 19.54424** 0.009** 1394 -628.62
Governance Policy 0.131793** 0.000"* 1448 -634.06
Directors' Base Pay 0.972824** 0.006** 1415 -642.72
Directors Active CEOs 1.137912 0.160 1452 -654.04
Outside Board Members (percent) 0.946619** 0.000** 1452 -642.98
Board Members with > 15 Years Experience (percent) 1.007446 0.579 1452 -654.87
Board Members on > 4 Boards (percent) 0.910409** 0.000"* 1452 -634.86
Board Members > 70 Years Old (percent) 1.007457 0.628 1452 -654.90
Women Board Members (percent) 0.952907** 0.022** 1452 -652.74
Existence of Dominant Shareholder 0.451333* 0.084* 1374 -622.50
Independent Audit Committee 2.926751 0.580 941 -481.14
Compensation Committee Independent 1.438963 0.752 963 -487.91
Nominating/Governance Committee Independent 0.3852763 0.148 963 -486.87
CEO Is Chairman 1.165624 0.416 945 -621.68
Note: This Table reports, in terms of order statistics, the marginal effect of each governance attribute estimated
separately; the Table excludes the coefficients for the baseline parameters, such as capitalization, price, volume,
abnormal returns, volatility, and jurisdiction. With the exception of CEOs who are also chairmen, the baseline
model coefficients are qualitatively similar. Coefficients significant at the 5 percent (10 percent) level are
denoted by ** (*).
That said, there are, to be sure, at least some variables in Table 2a
that are statistically significant. Before proceeding with that discussion,
however, a word of caution is in order. As noted above, larger samples
are more likely - by virtue of the sample size - to yield statistically sig-
nificant results. Thus, it is necessary to concentrate not only on those
variables that appear to be statistically significant but to refine our
tastes further to require that there be some economic significance asso-
ciated with the variable. Luckily, in this case, all statistically significant
variables appear to carry economic significance as well.
Consider first the effect of ownership composition. As the total
ownership stake held by institutional investors increases (row three), the
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odds of a shareholder suit declines. This finding is intuitive, and is consis-
tent with greater willingness by institutional shareholders to use direct
monitoring and governance pressure (rather than threatened litigation)
as a core managerial discipline device. Similarly, the existence of a domi-
nant shareholder also predicts a lower susceptibility to later class action
litigation and is mildly statistically significant. One potential interpreta-
tion of this effect is that both institutional-ownership-dominant share-
holders may be both good monitors and well positioned to exercise
more control over the company, thereby forestalling shareholder litiga-
tion. Significantly, this effect does not appear to carry over to companies
controlled by insiders, which face significant agency-cost problems not-
withstanding the insiders' enhanced stake in company value.
Next, consider the effects of board structure. As noted above, many
of the reforms brought about by SOX, including outside majorities on
the board and on significant board committees, appear not to matter
much at all in predicting susceptibility to litigation exposure. However,
there are some factors that do appear to play a role. Most notably, the
firm's possession of a business ethics code significantly increases the
predicted susceptibility to suit, with an order statistic of almost twenty.
Conversations with practitioners suggest that this may make some sense
for a number of reasons. First, the existence of a business ethics code is
voluntary and may be endogenously determined by a "bad apples" ef-
fect-that is, bad managers are forced to adopt business ethics codes in
addition to being sued more. 3 In addition, the existence of a business
ethics code provides a benchmark against which to measure subsequent
behavior. Divergence from a stated ethics code can provide particula-
rized evidence of intent to defraud, making things somewhat easier on
prospective plaintiffs." Conversely, the possession of a formal corporate
governance policy predicts a substantially lower litigation-risk threshold.
One possible interpretive story here is that a governance code clarifies
the processes that shareholders may expect to be accorded should they
attempt to challenge management through nonlitigious means, thereby
either providing valuable procedural information to shareholders or
sending a signal that the corporation will be receptive to such endeavors.'
43 Recall that SOX did not require companies to adopt business ethics codes; rather, § 406
requires them to disclose whether they have adopted one consistent with the criteria laid out in
the section. See SOX § 406(a), 116 Stat at 789, codified at 15 USC § 7264(a). Listing require-
ments at the SRO level subsequently required all issuers to adopt one. See, for example, NYSE,
Listed Company Manual at § 303A.10 (cited in note 10).
44 See Harvey L. Pitt and Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 Georgetown L J 1559,1560 (1990).
45 Although it is often plaintiffs' attorneys (and not shareholders) who make an initial deci-
sion to bring class actions, an availing governance code might still augur against litigation risk by
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Next, consider the attributes of the directors themselves. Although
the existence of an outside majority on the board does not itself appear
to have much predictive power (see Table 2a), the overall fractional re-
presentation of outside directors on the board (that is, outside board
membership measured on a continuous scale) does appear to have a
nontrivial dampening effect.4 Delving deeper into the data, it turns out
that most of this effect is identified from inframarginal boards possess-
ing a minority of outside directors: increasing outside composition (even
if not to a majority) appears to substantially reduce litigation risk. 7 This
may be because minority outside directors, while formally powerless to
effect change on the board, may act as effective whistleblowers."
Finally, the data pick up two other predictive component-specific
effects. First, the percentage representation on a board of members who
serve on multiple (four or more) boards appears to predict significantly
dampened litigation risk. This effect remains robust (and even a bit
stronger) with other baseline models or permutations of controls. In
some respects, multiple board service would not automatically seem to
predict a lower susceptibility to litigation. However, there is one sense
in which board overlap can serve as an important information dissemi-
nation device. Many practitioners with whom I have spoken about this
effect agree that maintaining a degree of multiple board experience
provides useful avenues for shared knowledge among members of the
board. This interboard learning effect may prove significant in coming
years given the decline in multiple board service witnessed in the post-
SOX era (a point that I shall return to in Part IV).'
Finally, the data suggest that the percentage composition of women
on the board tends to predict lower litigation exposure. Intriguing as it
inducing greater information revelation to the market sooner, which in turn can undermine the
viability of a later securities fraud action.
46 Even though the value of the odds ratio seems modest, remember that this variable is
measured continuously from 0 percent to 100 percent, and thus the coefficient measures the odds
ratio difference of a move of 1 percent in outside board representation.
47 Estimating this same model for companies that do not have an outside majority yields a
nearly identical coefficient estimate and standard error.
48 See, for example, Julie Creswell, A Board in Need of an Emily Post, NY Times C1 (Sept 7,
2006) (discussing the controversy over Hewlett-Packard obtaining phone records to determine the
source of board leaks and the role that Tom Perkins, an outside director, played in publicizing it).
49 My results on multiple board service are a bit distinct from those found in a recent paper
that concentrates more directly on board attributes per se. See Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jaganna-
than, and A.C. Pritchard, Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple
Board Appointments, 58 J Fin 1087, 1107-08 table VIII (2003) (using a matched sample approach
to consider the effect of multiple board service for firms sued between 1996 and 1998). Ferris,
Jagannathan, and Pritchard find essentially no significant difference. See id at 1109. The longer
panel and later time period studied here, along with somewhat more controls, may be playing
part of the role in explaining the difference in results. In addition, my results consider multiple
board service in terms of a dummy variable (that is, service on four or more boards), which may
pick up the especially experienced board members.
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may seem on first blush, the "women director" effect in particular turns
out not to be terribly robust after additional robustness checks (as dis-
cussed in greater detail below).
B. Litigation Exposure: Multivariable Effects
While a helpful first pass, the analysis in the previous Part II.A was
likely biased in the direction of uncovering statistically and economical-
ly significant effects. Notably, each of the regressions reported upon
above did not attempt to estimate litigation exposure as a function of
multiple governance attributes simultaneously (though the baseline
market controls were always employed). Although such a simplification
can be helpful in isolating the marginal effect of each variable, if two or
more variables are highly collinear, they may each appear significant
even when they tend to borrow one another's predictive power.
Table 2b considers this possibility with the seven factors identified
above as being statistically (and economically) significant in isolation,
estimating liability exposure with respect to these factors jointly (in addi-
tion to the baseline model). This "kitchen sink" regression is illustrated
in specification 1. Note that when all seven governance variables are si-
multaneously included, some lose explanatory power, and one-
particularly fractional composition of women directors-even switches
sign. This is not terribly surprising, since there are likely to be some linear
relationships among the governance variables. Accordingly, alternative
specifications are reported in Columns (2)-(4). As one can see from
the Table, the possession of a business ethics code, a governance code,
and the fraction of board members serving on over four boards have
effects that remain robustly significant throughout. The fractional out-
side composition of board members also retains significance, though
dropping to the 10 percent level in specification 4.
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TABLE 2B
RANDOM-EFFECrS LOGIT ESTIMATION;
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ISSUER NAMED IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION DURING SUCCEEDING REPORTING YEAR
Institutional Percentage
Business Ethics Code
Governance Policy
Directors' Base Pay (000s)
Outside Board Members (percent)
Board Members on >_ 4 Boards (percent)
Women Board Members (percent)
Baseline Controls Included?
N Observations
N Fsrms
Log Likelihood
Wald X'2 Statistic (p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.1273* 0.0959* 0.1404
(0.0970)* (0.0840)* (0.1150)
90.6921** 65.8014** 47.1639** 32.1158**
(0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0030)** (0.0040)**
0.1988** 0.2028** 0.1884"* 0.2326**
(0.0000)** (0.0010)** (0.0000)** (0.0010)**
0.9801* 0.9847
(0.0880)* (0.1810)
0.9453** 0.9487** 0.9517"* 0.9561*
(0.0000)** (0.0010)** (0.0010)** (0.0780)*
0.9294** 0.9359** 0.9402** 0.9305**
(0.0000)** (0.0010)** (0.0159)** (0.0000)**
1.0537
(0.1120)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
1291 1291 1303 1389
535 535 538 546
-550.722 -551.652 -557.838 -588.566
69.33** 64.47** 66.38** 81.11"*
Note: This Table reports, in terms of order statistics, the effect governance attributes estimated in combina-
tion; the Table estimates but does not report coefficients for the baseline parameters, such as capitalization, price,
volume, abnormal returns, volatility, and jurisdiction. The p-values are in parentheses. Coefficients significant
at the 5 percent (10 percent) level are denoted by ** (*).
The possible narrowing of the set of explanatory governance va-
riables to four (as in specification 4) draws some additional support from
a principal components analysis of the governance variables identified
in the marginal analysis of Part II.A.
50 Principal component analysis is a method within statistics to understand the structure of a
dataset by asking how much of a contribution each variable makes to the overall variation of the data.
For example, in the above dataset, if the percentage of women on a board were always 50 percent of
the percentage number of outside board members, then those two variables would be completely
replicative of one another. It would, in principle, be possible to throw one of them out and lose
no informational content in the data. Similarly, principal component analysis analyzes the covariance
relationships among the variables to determine how well the dataset can be simplified in terms of a
smaller number of synthesized variables (sometimes known as "factors"). It was developed first by
Karl Pearson over a century ago. See generally Karl Pearson, On Lines and Planes of Closest Fit to
Systems of Points in Space, 2 The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Mag and J Sci 559
(July-Dec 1901), online at http://stat.smmu.edu.cn/history/pearson1901.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
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Although reasonable minds can (and do) differ on the precise cri-
teria for determining the minimal acceptable number of factors, the
structure of these seven governance variables appears consistent with
something between a two- and six-factor model. A principal component
decomposition of these variables yields Table 2c.
TABLE 2C
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF SEVEN SIGNIFICANT
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES FROM TABLE 2B
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative
1 1.87323 26.76% 26.76%
2 1.002 14.31% 41.07%
3 0.94647 13.52% 54.60%
4 0.91805 13.12% 67.71%
5 0.82832 11.83% 79.54%
6 0.74964 10.71% 90.25%
7 0.68229 9.75% 100.00%
Conventional a priori desiderata for principal component analysis
commonly favor selecting a set of factors that (1) have eigenvalues that
exceed one, (2) are each able to explain at least 10 percent of the va-
riance in the data, and (3) collectively explain at least 75 percent of the
variance in the data." Table 2c illustrates whether each of these crite-
ria is satisfied (white fill) versus not satisfied (gray fill) for various
posited numbers of factors ranging from one to seven. As is clear from
the Table, no set of factors satisfies all three conventional criteria, but
one could justifiably maintain that somewhere between two and six
factors are reasonable for explaining variation among the remaining
governance variables.
Ultimately, the analysis of whether governance structure can pre-
dict the incidence of suit suggests that there may be some relationship
between governance policy and litigation risk. However, the effects are
haphazard, relatively uneven (given the size of the dataset), and gener-
ally inconsistent with some of the principal reforms brought about in
the post-SOX era.
III. PREDICTING SETTLEMENT VALUE
Another potentially informative approach to measuring effects of
governance goes beyond the question of litigation risk and more di-
rectly to the question of liability exposure for companies that are sub-
51 See I.T. Jolliffe, Principal Component Analysis 111-49 (Springer-Verlag 2d ed 2002).
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ject to suit. On an intuitive level, this question is well worth pursuing,
for litigation often accompanies other disputes within the organization.
A well-governed firm may not only help avoid crises but may also give
itinerant shareholders an alternative (nonlegal) venue to air their griev-
ances once such grievances arise. An issuer's openness to governance-
led redress may also be reflected in settlements where the issuer agrees
to governance reforms (with no or more modest monetary sanctions
accompanying them). Indeed, in some respects the effect of governance
on exposure conditional on a lawsuit may even be a more telling baro-
meter of litigation risk.
This Part briefly explores that relationship using an identical set of
market, industry, and size controls as in the litigation-risk regressions
above.2 The central question here is whether-conditional on suit-a
particular governance attribute predicts a greater or lesser susceptibility
to damages exposure than similarly situated defendants without such an
attribute. Thus, in what follows, I limit my inquiry to issuers who appear
in my litigation database and for which I have governance metrics
matches in the CL data."
A. Monetary Exposure: Marginal Effects
Recall, not all suits that are filed are resolved (through adjudicated
outcomes or settlement) for positive monetary amounts; some are dis-
missed, and others are settled for nonmonetary amounts. For these cas-
es, I infer that damages are functionally truncated at zero. Therefore, a
Tobit specification is plausible and appropriate." In particular, I esti-
mate the following piecewise linear specification:
52 See Table 1d. As noted in Part H in the litigation-risk analysis, I deliberately exclude the exis-
tence of restatements, compensation, and federal civil/criminal litigation as right-hand side variables,
for fear that their endogeneity and the lack of reliable instruments will bias governance coefficients.
These factors, however, have been shown to be predictive of litigation. See, for example, Michael A.
Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution: No Harm, No Foul? *30 (St John's Legal Studies Research
Paper No 08-0135, May 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133995 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
53 As noted below, the total number of governance matches varies depending on the go-
vernance characteristic of interest. See Part III.A.
54 It is also possible that the truncation point is not at zero, given the relative paucity of mon-
etary settlement around zero. As a robustness check, I also experimented with a two-stage Tobit
(sometimes known as Heckman approach) specification, which yields qualitatively similar results
(not reported here).
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(7[I+ a ,Xi, t +- z, ' +t .6i't if Yi,,+, 
> 0
{a + f 0 else
where - as in Part II.A - a, 8, and y represent estimated parameters;
z, is a vector of industry and securities market controls (identical to
those in Table ld); ,e, is an error term; and y,,, denotes the logged real
monetary value (in 2005 dollars) of the case filed in the one-year for-
ward reporting year (if resolved by March 2006) in the form of either
cash or liquid securities. For all dismissed cases or cases that were re-
solved solely with governance reforms or nonliquid assets, I impose a
value of y, , = 0. As with the earlier analysis, for each specification in
this Part x,, denotes a single governance characteristic of the issuer,
considered in sequence.
The University of Chicago Law Review
TABLE 3A
RANDOM-EFFECTS TOBIT ESTIMATION;
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOGGED REAL VALUE IN 2005 DOLLARS
OF SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONAL ON BEING SUED
Governance Variable Coefficient p-value N LogLik P(X')
Insiders Control
Institutional Majority
Institutional Percentage
Classified/Staggered Board
Outside Majority Board
Outside Board Meetings
Business Ethics Code
Governance Policy
Directors' Base Pay
Directors Active CEOs
Outside Board Members (percent)
Board Members with > 15 Years
Experience (percent)
Board Members Serving on > 4 Boards
(percent)
Board Members > 70 Years Old (percent)
Women Board Members (percent)
Existence of Dominant Shareholder
Independent Audit Committee
Independent Compensation Committee
Nominating/Governance Committee
Independent
CEO Is Chairman
-3.813
6.460
-7.699
-6.114**
-9.396
14.661*
-12.586
-13.263**
-0.093
0.882*
0.120
0.786
0.332
0.390
0.045**
0.153
0.062*
0.433
0.001**
0.331
0.093*
0.226
-105.70
-105.57
-231.89
-247.33
-247.39
-104.78
-105.67
-244.52
-247.54
-247.19
-247.52
0.3974
0.3704
0.3070
0.2032
0.2613
0.2613
0.0347
0.0317
0.3762
0.2172
0.2934
0.147 0.117 242 -247.28 0.2478
-0.369**
0.026
-0.192
-3.108
91.498
102.351
5.370
0.014**
0.842
0.298
0.686
0.991
0.992
0.557
-246.23
-247.88
-247.62
-97.99
-92.73
-92.60
-92.82
0.1186
0.3791
0.3211
0.4981
0.6437
0.5920
0.5949
2.496 0.582 74 -133.71 0.6480
Note: This Table reports the marginal effect of each governance attribute estimated separately on an underlying
settlement amount, where nonmonetary settlements, drops, defendant victories, and dismissals represent truncations
at zero. All estimations include (but do not report on) coefficients for the baseline model. Coefficients significant at
the 5 percent (10 percent) level are denoted by ** (*).
A few features of these regression specifications are worth noting.
First, there is some arbitrariness to how I have defined the zero-
truncation point -in particular, the fact that it excludes settlements hav-
ing solely governance reforms or involving solely nonliquid securities,
and that it includes even small monetary settlements. As to the former,
some settlements, while not easily monetized in dollar figures, have both
a cost to the issuer and a benefit to the plaintiffs. Thus, my specifica-
tion tends to discount the significance of such reforms entirely. There
is a potential danger that this categorization scheme will tend to bias my
results downward, since "poorly" governed firms may well be sued as a
means for improving their governance. As to the latter (small monetary
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settlements), some tend to view settlements under, say, $2 million as
tantamount to a nuisance suit, and such suits should be treated accor-
dingly. Even if this characterization is valid, it is still relevant for the
question of whether governance augurs against litigation risk, since
nuisance suits represent real costs to issuers.
In addition, note that due to irregularities in the CL data and the
smaller number of litigated cases, the total number of cases considered
in each specification varies. While this was also true for the litigation-
risk regressions reported in Table 2a, it can have a more significant
impact given the smaller sample size here, which ranges between 74
and 243 cases. Consequently, there is significantly more noise in these
estimations, and the reliability of the coefficient estimates is therefore
somewhat more suspect.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the marginal effects of each gover-
nance variable as a predictor of exposure had significantly less explana-
tory power. Indeed, under conventional significance criteria, only classi-
fied/staggered boards, the presence of a governance policy, and service
on multiple boards appear to exhibit statistically significant explana-
tory power. Others appear to have very little or no statistical power.
The most plausible interpretation of the statistically significant
coefficients is similar to that offered above. The presence of a gover-
nance policy, for example, may credibly signal the availability of alter-
native dispute resolution devices, and moreover, may be associated
with earlier interventions in potential problems than at other firms. In
addition, multiple board service may provide for a stock of experien-
tial capital that is helpful for firms contending with securities litigation
for perhaps the first time. Finally, unlike the litigation-risk estimations,
the presence of a classified/staggered board tends to reduce predicted
monetary exposure conditional on suit. This effect seems intuitively
plausible: classified/staggered boards tend to dampen the deterrent ef-
fects of the takeover market in stemming managerial agency costs,
which may place a greater emphasis on other mechanisms of deterrence
(such as litigation). This may give shareholders of such companies an
incentive to bring suit even for relatively small-stakes matters, which
would be consistent with a lower predicted monetary exposure of suits
against those companies.5
The presence of directors who are also CEOs of other companies
predicted a larger settlement fund, which was mildly statistically signifi-
cant. The CEO effect is interesting and may be suggestive of greater
litigation risk among firms that have large structural biases within them
55 It should be noted from Table 2a that classified/staggered boards did face a greater
estimated exposure to filings, though the estimated coefficient was not statistically significant.
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(for example, a fraternity of CEOs who, when serving on a board, tend
not to meddle in other CEOs' decisions). On the other hand, it could
also be an artifact of inadequate market and size controls (beyond
those used here) in which larger firms are more likely to have CEOs on
the board and are also more likely to be exposed to litigation risk.
B. Monetary Exposure: Joint Effects
The three governance variables identified in Part II.B as having the
strongest predictive power also appear to retain much of their power
when estimated jointly, as illustrated in Table 3b. The Table reports on all
multiple permutations of a classified/staggered board, multiple board
service, and the presence of a governance policy. Both classified/
staggered boards and governance policy variables retain significance at
the 5 percent level in each permutation. While multiple board service
loses some explanatory power, it is still significant at the 10 percent level
in the presence of the other two variables. Consequently, it appears that
all three of these governance variables have some explanatory power in
predicting exposure once sued.5
TABLE 3B
RANDOM-EFFECTS TOBIT ESTIMATION; DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
LOGGED REAL VALUE IN 2005 DOLLARS OF SETTLEMENT,
CONDITIONAL ON BEING SUED
Classified/Staggered Board
Board Members on _ 4 Boards
Governance Policy
Baseline Controls Included?
N Observations
Log Likelihood
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-2.8221** -2.6029** -2.8152**
(0.0300)** (0.0450)** (0.0320)**
-0.1163* -0.1676** -0.1030
(0.0750)* (0.0100)** (0.1130)
-5.0326** -5.7934** -5.0438**
(0.0030)** (0.0010)** (0.0030)**
Yes Yes Yes Yes
242 242 242 242
-206.949 -207.788 -209.436 -208.145
Wald X Statistic (p-value) 0.016 0.0192 0.0663 0.0257
Note: This Table reports the marginal predictive effect of each governance attribute to the monetary settlement
amount, where nonmonetary settlements, drops, defendant victories, and dismissals represent truncations at zero. All
reported coefficients reflect (but do not report on) estimations of a baseline model set of controls. Coefficients signifi-
cant at the 5 percent (10 percent) level are denoted by ** (*).
56 Of these individually significant variables, a principal components analysis (similar to
that of the previous Part) also lends support to a three-factor specification.
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IV. DISCUSSION
So, what are we to make of all of this, and what does it hold for
the private-equity wave? At the very least, there are three central im-
plications that come out of the econometric analysis above. I discuss
each of them briefly below.
First and foremost, it is somewhat surprising to find how few go-
vernance variables are really predictors of litigation risk. Indeed, most of
the governance structures that my data contain do not appear, at least
directly, to have a significant predictive effect on either litigation risk or
exposure to damages, once one controls for structural and market in-
centives for litigation. Of the twenty governance variables considered,
only seven appear to have any appreciable statistical power in predicting
suit, and in fact there appear to be fewer still (between two and six)
whose predictive effect is robust across many specifications. Of sued
firms, only three of the twenty governance variables appear to have sig-
nificant predictive effects. This collective non-result may be just as im-
portant as the statistically significant ones. As noted above, it bears on the
extent to which classically defined "good governance" augurs against (or,
in more economic terms, serves as a "substitute" for) lawsuits. Although
it would be a lot to expect the data to test these sorts of causal claims
definitively (no less to reject them), for many of the reasons explored
above, this is at least potentially a troubling finding. Indeed, many re-
ceived practices of "good governance" have been imposed or made qua-
si-mandatory by SOX and its regulatory progeny with the articulated
goal of making securities investments safer, and thus impliedly suggest-
ing that investors would resort to suit less. However, many of the very
governance structures mandated by SOX, such as committee and board
independence, have scant predictive power within my data.57 Although
such mandates may indeed have had beneficial effects, those effects do
not appear manifest in private securities litigation trends.
Nevertheless, some governance metrics do appear to have some
predictive effect on litigation, and that effect is robust across differing
statistical approaches. The adoption of a governance policy appears to
have a resilient predictive effect on litigation risk. Although the SOX
statute did not require the adoption of a governance policy, the listing
exchanges have done so themselves. The New York Stock Exchange list-
ing requirements, for example, require issuers to adopt and disclose cor-
porate governance guidelines; and while the listing requirements do not
57 Of course, it is far from clear that the mandates of SOX were intended as much to reduce
litigation exposure as to make firms better governed generally. But to the extent that securities
litigation is an imperfect substitute for good governance, one might expect (or at least hope) that
securities litigation rates would also be sensitive to tools that implement good governance.
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mandate the precise content of those guidelines, they do require inclu-
sion and discussion of at least certain attributes, such as director qualifi-
cations, director compensation, director education, conflicts of interest
policies, and management succession. % It remains to be seen, of course,
whether the mandated adoption and disclosure of such policies will
have the same effect as the largely voluntary disclosures made by most
firms within the data analyzed here. Nevertheless, what is extractable
from the data seems positive: indeed, if one confines attention solely
to the post-SOX years (regression estimations not reported here), the
estimated litigation-risk coefficient on governance policies declines
significantly relative to its pre-SOX counterpart."
In addition, boards whose members are also members of numerous
other boards appear -holding all else constant -to be the least suscept-
ible to securities litigation. As noted above, this predictive effect may
make some sense in light of the potential for multiple board service to
disseminate knowledge across different issuers' boards. If this correlation
has a causal component, there may be some reason to be concerned, as
the incidence of multiple board service in US corporations has been
steadily declining. As Figure 1 below illustrates, since the late 1990s,
both the incidence and the standard deviation of multiple board service
have steadily declined in the last decade, a fact that may be partially
due to the legal and cultural aversion that many have to placing the
"usual suspects" on a public board. While such changes may have some
merit, they do create one pitfall in that they tend to reduce the amount of
shared wisdom about valuable lessons (usually in the form of "war sto-
ries") that board members may bring from one boardroom into another.
58 See NYSE, Listed Company Manual at § 303A.09 (cited in note 10).
59 Likely due to data restrictions, the noise in estimating this coefficient ebbs in and out of
significance.
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FIGURE 1
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC
COMPANY BOARDS ON WHICH BOARD MEMBERS SAT, 1998-2006
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Finally, the analysis above at least suggests that the presence of a
classified/staggered board may also affect litigation risk, though the
direction of this effect is complicated: firms with classified/staggered
boards face a larger estimated risk of litigation (though this estimated
effect, while large economically, was not statistically significant) but a
lower exposure once sued. This combination of effects is consistent with
the common view that classified/staggered boards are a telltale sign of
entrenched management and that shareholders may be utilizing securi-
ties litigation as a substitute for more direct governance. Significantly,
however, the ability of a company to stagger its board was not in play
during the promulgation of SOX or its regulatory implementation."
60 It might also be the case that the settlements in cases involving staggered boards are
more likely to be skewed toward governance reforms rather than pure cash payments. Although
my data did not allow for testing this claim, it does appear to be a growing trend in securities
litigation. See, for example, Bristol-Myers Squibb Agrees to Record Securities Litigation Settle-
ment with Sweeping Data Disclosure Requirements Announces Labaton Sucharow, Bus Wire (Jan
23,2006).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the empirical analysis presented in this Article paints a
suggestive account of the relationship between governance and litigation
as the dog that either did not bark, or did so only intermittently. On the
one hand, there do appear to be a handful of governance attributes that
predict lower litigation incidence to securities class actions and/or mone-
tary exposure thereto. Some, such as institutional investor activity, stag-
gered/classified boards, and well-developed governance policies, may
reflect plausible causal stories that justify use by insurers, investors, and
others as reliable predictors of fraud." In this respect at least, companies
that remain publicly owned might fruitfully consider responsive reforms
as a means to reduce both litigation risk and associated insurance premia.
On the other hand, along most governance traits studied here, the
link between governance and litigation risk seems a tenuous and inde-
terminate one. Various popular measures of "good" governance-such
as board/committee independence, independent board member activity,
and separation of CEO and board chair positions-have extremely noi-
sy predictive effects on a firm's prospective susceptibility to shareholder
litigation. And it is here that the relationship to both SOX and the pri-
vate-equity trend of the early 2000s may be most significant: as noted
above, one of the widely articulated reasons for the private-equity wave
of the last half-decade centered on the relative costs of remaining as a
public company in the post-SOX world. A fair criticism of this rationale
is that it does not take account of various benefits associated with greater
legal scrutiny. One such benefit - at least in theory - is that the transpa-
rency and governance reforms encouraged by SOX (and its progeny)
would make public securities less vulnerable to corporate fraud, and thus
public issuers would be less susceptible to litigation. As demonstrated,
however, the governance templates introduced by SOX seem largely
askew with the few governance attributes that predict litigation risk.
To be sure, the panoply of SOX reforms may well have created pub-
lic and private benefits outside of the realm of litigation. They may, for
example, have reduced firms' costs of debt and equity capital generally;
or instilled public investors with greater confidence generally, increasing
market depth and reducing volatility; or efficiently pushed the most opa-
que and fraud-prone companies toward private ownership structures.
Any of these effects could (in theory) justify the regulatory reforms as a
matter of public policy. As a device for reducing private securities litiga-
tion through better governance, however, the principal governance re-
forms set in motion by SOX do not appear to be appreciable empirically.
61 As noted in the Introduction, however, my analysis is not capable of testing these causal
claims directly.
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